

The Effects of Power and Partnership on Application Service Provider Commitment, Cooperation, and Compliance

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Abstract

The growth of information technology (IT) outsourcing has dramatically increased during the 1990s by tens of billions of dollars annually. Part of this current growth may come from new kinds of outsourcing services such as Application Service Providers (ASPs). But despite market growth, several of these outsourcing ventures are failing. Thus, if the IT outsourcing model, especially its new forms, is to succeed in the future it becomes necessary to identify how to successfully manage these complex relationships in order to ensure the delivery of high quality and consistently reliable IT products and services. Using an experimental methodology, this research investigates the impact of partnership quality and the client's power on the service provider's compliance, cooperation, and commitment. The results show that the client's power and the quality of their partnership with the provider motivates the IT service provider to comply with the contractual obligations, cooperate with the client, and invest additional resources into the IT outsourcing relationship.

1. Introduction

One of the most critical issues associated with the success of an IT outsourcing relationship is how well the IT service provider performs over time [31]; in other words, will the provider continue to update knowledge and technology to account for the ever changing environmental conditions and customer needs [9]. Though IT outsourcing has changed and expanded over the years, performance risks associated with the

service provider's ability to meet current and future IT requirements has been and continues to be a main concern for both traditional and new forms of outsourcing, such as business process outsourcing, e-business hosting, and application service providers (ASPs). A growing number of companies, once happy with their IT service provider's performance, are dissatisfied and are looking to switch providers [20]. Therefore, if organizations wish to leverage IT outsourcing as a new business model, it will be important for them to effectively manage and motivate service providers to ensure delivery of high-quality and consistently reliable IT products and services now and into the future.

Based on social and relational exchange theory and using an experimental methodology, this research provides insights into how a client firm's power and quality of its partnership with its IT services provider can supplement the contractual relationship by motivating provider's behavior and performance. While most IT outsourcing literature has focused on the client's perspective, this research examines the influence of client's power and quality of the partnership from the IT service provider's perspective.

This paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on IT outsourcing, focusing on the theories best suited for analyzing the dynamics of interorganizational relationships (IORs). Second, we develop the research model and hypotheses regarding the impact of power and partnership on service provider's compliance, cooperation and commitment. Next, the research method and analysis techniques are described. Finally, results are discussed and implication for managers and future directions for research are provided. The term service provider is used throughout the remainder of this paper to indicate

any vendor who provides either IT products or services in the context of IT outsourcing.

2. Literature review

As IT outsourcing market has evolved over the years, so has the research associated with the phenomena [27]. Early case studies of IT outsourcing relationships found that the use of multiple service providers, detailed contracts, penalty clauses, short term agreements, IT legal experts and promises of contract extensions were effective mechanisms for establishing a client's power in the relationship in order to achieve successful outsourcing outcomes [24, 25, 26]. These studies based on economic theories, such as transaction cost theory and agency theory, focused on how to efficiently structure the governance of the IT outsourcing engagement but ignored the relational dynamics involved. More recent research in IT outsourcing states the limitations of economic-based theories for analyzing ongoing IT outsourcing relationships, and has looked to relational exchange and power political theories to better explain successful long-term outsourcing engagements [28]. Researchers in this area argue that social theories based on trust and power are more appropriate for analyzing the continuing development and growth of interorganizational relationships (IORs) [27]. Using social theoretical perspectives Grover et al. [13] and Lee et al. [28] found evidence supporting the relationship between partnership and IT outsourcing success. However, these studies failed to directly address the affect of power as an alternate mechanism for managing IT outsourcing relationships.

Literature on IORs has viewed both power and partnership as key factors in motivating the relational partner's short-term and long-term performance. Therefore, drawing from both the IT outsourcing and related IOR literature, the research model developed next incorporates both power and partnership and their motivational impact on the service provider's compliance, cooperation, and commitment.

3. Theory and model

In the theoretical research model illustrated in Figure 1, the constructs of power and partnership are hypothesized to influence the service provider's level of compliance, cooperation, and commitment. A detailed discussion of the arguments supporting this model is provided next.

3.1. Provider compliance

In the context of IT outsourcing, compliance is defined as an IT service provider's ability to meet service level agreements (SLAs). SLAs establish the expected service levels and system performance to be delivered by the service provider. SLAs have become quite prominent in IT outsourcing contacts; and are often the basis upon which new forms of outsourcing relationships, such as ASPs, are predicated. The problem with SLAs is they represent the minimal effort a service provider must devote to the relationship. Lacity et al. [23] noted that IT service providers often refer to the details of the contract as their only required obligation to the client. This research does not consider actual IT service provider's compliance but rather their intent to comply, which represents the minimal effort the service provider is willing to devote to the relationship.

3.2. Provider cooperation

Cooperation is defined as the extent to which parties engage in complementary activities to achieve mutual goals [12]. Cooperation not only safeguards IORs against the hazards of opportunism [42] but also instills a flexible relationship capable of adjusting to market changes. Parties in cooperative relationships take on collaborative roles to ensure that joint objectives are met [40]. Skinner et. al. [38] identified cooperation as necessary component in successful IORs. Service providers and clients who take a more cooperative approach to outsourcing are more likely to be successful [13, 31].

Compliance by the IT service provider is often mistaken for cooperation by the client, but the two concepts are very distinct. Cooperation is viewed as proactive approach to the relationship, while compliance is more passive [33]. Cooperation involves much more than just adhering to requirements, it is a process of working together to identify and implement the best possible solutions. Thus, cooperation represents the maximum effort the service provider is willing to devote to the relationship. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1: A service provider's intention to cooperate will have a positive effect on the service provider's intention to comply.

3.3. Provider commitment

Both compliance and cooperation represent the IT service provider's current state of behavior; where as commitment, reveals the service provider's intentions about the relationship's future. Literature on IORs views commitment as a key factor in determining long-term relationships [8, 14, 33]; with Dwyer et. al. [8, p.

23] proposing that “commitment represents the highest stage of relational bonding.” Because of the difficulty in obtaining consistent service outcomes in IT outsourcing, clients will commit to ongoing relationships with providers who are able to reach desired service levels [13].

Commitment has also been associated with relational concepts such as motivation, loyalty, involvement, durability, consistency, pledges, idiosyncratic investments, and dedicated resources. Recently, there is a growing perception that commitment is composed of three distinct dimensions [14, 22]. Kumar et. al. [22] classify these dimensions as willingness to invest, affective commitment, and expectation of continuity; Gundlach et. al. [14] conceptualize a similar classification but use the terms instrumental, attitudinal, and temporal commitment. This research adopts the dimensions proposed by Kumar et al. [22].

Kumar et al. [22] treat commitment as second order constructs comprised of all three dimensions; however, Gundlach et al. [14] provided theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence of causal and intertemporal relationships between the dimensions and referred to their influence on each other as a “self-enforcing cycle.”. This cycle may be portrayed by two repeating phases, an economic phase, involving the investment of resources, and a relational phase, in which parties develop attitudes and expectation about the future. Long-term relationships start with parties making credible investments [14]; this is consistent with Williamson’s [42] view that idiosyncratic inputs by both parties lead to long-term relationships. In the context of IT outsourcing, such inputs may include dedicated technology resources, personnel, and stock options in the other organization. These inputs represent a vested interest in the relationship and perpetuate a belief that parties want to become more deeply involved with each other [22]. Economic commitments are similar to a “signaling mechanism,” demonstrating to the other party that relationship is valuable. These economic commitments help generate a sense of security as well as a sense of worth with respect to the relationship, thus enhancing the affective commitment of the parties. Such investments, especially if very specific to the outsourcing relationship, also create high switching costs and result in a greater desire to maintain and continue the relationship into the future [18]. After investments into an IOR are made, a transition from the economic phase to the relational phase begins. Because this research is focused on the social factors impacting the IT service provider’s continuous investment into the outsourcing relationship the relational phase of commitment is only considered in this research. In the

economic phase, dedicated resource influence increased commitment; in the relational phase, both affective commitment and expectations of continuity begin their impact on increasing commitment levels. In service relationships, including IT outsourcing, it is often more cost effective for the service provider to maintain current customers as opposed to continually developing new ones; especially if current services are satisfying their clients’ needs. Therefore, a feeling that their relationship is going well, i.e., affective commitment, will lead the service provider to continue the relationship into the future. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2a: A service provider’s affective commitment toward an outsourcing relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider’s expectation about continuing the relationship.

Further investments into the relationship will also continue if the service provider believes the relationship is adding value and generating sufficient returns. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2b: The service provider’s affective commitment toward the outsourcing relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider’s willingness to further invest in the relationship.

Hypothesis 2c: The service provider’s expectation about continuing the outsourcing relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider’s willingness to further invest in the relationship.

Parties who are committed to the relationship work harder at handling problems and ensuring achievement of both individual and joint goals [32]. Therefore, commitment plays a central role in determining the level of cooperation and compliance in IT outsourcing relationships. The commitment-trust theory supports the causal influence of commitment on both compliance and cooperation [33]; however, the theory provides no guidance on which dimensions of commitment, if not all, affect these two constructs. It is proposed that only willingness to invest and expectation of continuity will influence cooperation and that only expectation of continuity influences compliance. It is also proposed that affective commitment will only indirectly influence a service provider’s compliance and cooperation through the other two dimensions of commitment. These casual relationships are based on the assumption that there is an underlying reasoning process the service provider goes through before making the decision to cooperate and/or comply. Affective commitment, the feeling that the relationship has value, drives the provider to continue the relationship and commit additional resources. Given that the service provider has decided to continue the outsourcing relationship into the future implies that service provider intends to exert some effort and resources into the relationship. Service

providers' expectations about how long it will take to realize a return on vested effort and resources and, thus, how far into the future their outsourcing relationships should last, should dictate the amount of minimum (compliance) and maximum (cooperation) effort that the providers will be willing to put forth. Therefore:

Hypothesis 3a: A service provider's expectations about continuing an outsourcing relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider's intention to cooperate.

Hypothesis 3b: A service provider's expectation about continuing an outsourcing relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider's intention to comply.

If the service provider is willing to invest resources into the relationship, it is reasoned that the provider is willing to exert greater effort (cooperation) to ensure its investments. Therefore:

Hypothesis 3c: A service provider's willingness to further invest in a relationship will have a positive effect on the service provider's intention to cooperate.

3.4. Power as function of dependence

Over the recent years there has been an increased interest in study of power in the IS domain [21], but power has been a difficult construct to measure and define [34]. In order to facilitate a study of power in IS, Jasperson, et. al. [21] provided a paradigm based in part on Bradshaw-Camball's [3] power framework. This research uses the pluralist view of power, as defined by the framework, which assumes that parties involved in a relationship have different and often times conflicting goals. This view of power in the context of IT outsourcing relationships seems quite reasonable, since in most cases, a service provider's profit motives often run counter to the client's service needs [25]. The pluralist view of power is most commonly associated with Emerson's [10, p.32] conceptualization of power as a function of dependence; where the basis of a party's power over another party lies in the other party's dependence on the relationship.

Social exchange theorists [8, 17, 33] have used power, conceptualized by dependence, as a means of explaining motivational forces for sustaining IORs. Their arguments for why parties choose to remain in IORs are grounded in economic theory, where parties continue relationships that are profitable. Similarly, IT service providers are more likely to continue a relationship that generates economic value or prevents economic losses (e.g. cost of dissolving the relationship or cost of replacing the client). The more

dependent the IT service provider is on the relationship, the more likely the provider will remain in the relationship. Therefore:

Hypothesis 4: A client's power over service provider will have a positive effect on the service provider's expectation about continuing the relationship.

It should be noted that unlike the link between relational investments and affective commitment discussed in Section 3.3; power, conceptualized as service provider's dependence on the relationship, does not lead to increased levels of affective commitment. The reason is that relational investments include investments made by both the client and provider, while the IT service provider's dependence is a function, in part, of their own investments into the relationship; therefore, based on arguments in Section 3.3, it would be the client's increased investments in the relationship that would potentially motivate the provider's affective commitment but not the provider's own investments.

3.5. Partnership quality

Drawing on the work of Grover et al. [13], partnership quality has been defined to consist of four dimensions: trust, satisfaction, communication and cooperation. An effort was made to use a conservative definition of partnership that did not imply any economic constructs, since profit motives of service providers often run counter to the service desires of clients [25]. Thus, this definition is more in line with the concepts of relationship quality [6] and relational norms [29, 30] in the IOR literature than of "true" partnership. It should be noted that cooperation as used in this context of partnership quality differs from the provider cooperation previously discussed in Section 3.2. Here cooperation refers to the client's cooperative behavior while the earlier cooperation construct referred to providers' cooperative behavior.

The concept of partnership quality in IT outsourcing is predominately based on Macneil's relational exchange theory [29, 30], which stems from the inability of contracts to effectively manage complex IORs. This has led to arguments that quality of relationship between IT service providers and their clients significantly impacts success of IT outsourcing engagements [31]. As relationships become more complex, with service providers taking on greater responsibility in fulfilling clients' IT needs, partnership-style relationships become necessary to maintain flexibility and handle changes. Past IT outsourcing literature [13, 28, 36] has empirically demonstrated the positive relationship between partnership quality and IT outsourcing success but only

from the client's perspective. However, this research is focused on the service provider's viewpoint; therefore, the motivational effect of partnership quality on service provider needs to be investigated. It is proposed that client's attitudes and actions with respect to an IT outsourcing relationship shape the service provider's attitudes toward the relationship (affective commitment) and eventually influence provider's actions. As a client communicates their positive attitudes and behaviors pertaining to their relationship with a service provider, these are internalized and reciprocated by the service provider. The key point here is the internalization of client attitudes and behaviors by the service provider. The provider will reciprocate positively only when they perceive positive client attitudes and behaviors pertaining to the relationship. Thus, we argue that partnership will only directly impact affective commitment. Therefore:

Hypothesis 5: Partnership quality will have a positive effect on the service provider's affective commitment to the outsourcing relationship.

4. Methodology

In order to test the hypothesized casual relationships in the proposed theoretical model (see Figure 1) an experiment was conducted using a 2 x 2 factorial design in which the degree of partnership (strong/weak) and level of power (high/low) were independently manipulated. This methodological approach has not been used in research evolving IT outsourcing; but has been used in research involving IS project implementation [16, 39], an area that partly overlaps with IT outsourcing. In addition, published studies in other management topics [e.g., 1, 2, 15] have used an experimental methodology to test theoretical models involving similar relational and/or power constructs in the context of IOR. However, these studies have not simultaneously included the dimensions of partnership and power as they relate to commitment, cooperation, and compliance.

4.1. Experimental scenario design

The experimental design involved a role-play exercise. Subjects were asked to read a brief scenario, similar to a case, about a contractual service relationship between an ASP and an individual client. Four treatments were created by manipulating the degree of partnership (strong/weak) and level of power (high/low). Based on the four dimensions of partnership relevant to outsourcing practices as defined by Grover et. al. [13], partnership was manipulated by a letter to the ASP's Vice President of Contract Management, which the subjects were told they had

written. A similar approach was used by Andaleeb [1, 2], Schurr et al. [37] and Sullivan et al. [41] to manipulate trust in the context of IOR. The power manipulation was defined as a function of the provider's dependence. The high power treatment was represented by stating few potential clients exist in the current market segment; revenues from services provided to this particular client substantially contributed to the ASP's profits; a large portion of the ASP's manpower and equipment had been solely allocated to fulfilling this particular client's needs and it would be very difficult and costly for the ASP to reallocate resources dedicated to this particular client to other customers. For the low power treatment the statements were reversed. As with partnership, previous experimental studies on IOR have used similar methods to manipulate dependence levels [1, 2, 15]. Based on the recommendations of Dennis et al. [7], treatment levels were differentiated sufficiently to maximize effects.

While almost any IT outsourcing context could have been the setting for the case scenarios, the ASP context was selected because the subject pool was familiar with this particular IT outsourcing topic area. In addition, ASP outsourcing tends to be highly contractually based and has been associated with many failed relationships; research into how factors outside the context of the contract may prove beneficial to current and future ASP outsourcing relationships.

4.2. Scenario decision situation

Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the role of the client account manager for the ASP described in the scenario. The role of a client account manager was chosen as opposed to that of a CIO or a CEO because the subjects could only better relate to this position level and thus more easily project themselves into the experimental role, this or a similar role is the typical role within client firms that is usually responsible for ongoing contract management. Subjects were told that top executives of the ASP were meeting in two weeks to discuss plans for future workforce and technological investments needed to service current and future customers; and that their boss has asked them to write a report describing how best to service their individual clients. In order to efficiently measure and capture all intermediate and dependent variables in our research model, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire containing items corresponding to all research constructs. They were told that the items were a series of possible recommendations on how to manage the client relationship, and were asked to indicate the extent to

which they agree or disagree with each recommendation.

4.3. Constructs and measures

An effort was made to adapt established and validated measures for the research constructs as to facilitate comparison, replication, generalization and validation. Measures were needed to (1) check if treatment manipulations were properly administered and (2) capture all exogenous and endogenous constructs. Individual items and their sources are available upon request from the authors. All items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale with end points being “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7).

4.4. Procedures

A group of MBA and undergraduate students were recruited for the experiment. The experiment was conducted two weeks before the end of the semester. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four treatments. Before actually conducting the experiment subjects were told that the case scenarios were developed using information from actual published ASP and IT outsourcing cases in order to simulate an actual situation an ASP may face; this was done to induce the feeling that the experimental conditions represented a real-world decision. As a means of increasing the subject's involvement in the experiment, participants were told that the researchers will be evaluating and comparing their responses based on education level and work experience. While the instructors who made their classes available for the experiment had the option to offer their students extra credit for participating, no such rewards were offered and no other incentives were mentioned or given by anyone involved in conducting the experiment.

4.5. Subjects

A total of 140 subjects, from the school of management at a large university in the northeast United States were recruited for the experimental study; 48 were graduate students taking an MBA level MIS course and 92 were undergraduate student taking a senior level MIS course. Of the 140 potential cases, one declined to participate, and 29 cases were removed from the initial data set because the subjects had no professional experience in information technology, general management or information technology management. It was felt the subject should have at least some relevant experience in order to adequately assume the role of the decision maker in the

experiment. A total of 110 cases (45 graduate and 65 undergraduate) composed the final data set.

There is some debate about the use of students as surrogates for managers; however, Remus [35] provides empirical support for the use of students as surrogates in the context of managerial decision making. In addition, there is precedence for using students, both graduate and undergraduate, as surrogates for managers in experimental studies involving information technology [39], project management [16], and vendor-client exchange relationships [1, 2, 15].

5. Results

Initially, manipulation checks were conducted to insure that all treatments were successfully administered. A 2x2 Type III MONOVA, using the manipulations as the independent variables and the average composite scores of the power and partnership measures as the dependent variables, was run to verify the effectiveness of the treatments and to investigate any interactions. Results showed the main effects of power and partnership were significant only in relation to their respective composite scores. Further, no interaction between the manipulations was found thereby indicating that the manipulations were effectively administered.

The research model was then assessed using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique and the PLS Graph software Version 03.00 Build 1016. Due to space limitations, results are only briefly presented in the paper. The reliability and validity of the PLS measurement model was performed following the three stage procedure described in the literature [5, 19]: (1) item reliability, (2) convergent validity and (3) discriminant validity. All items demonstrated good reliabilities, with all loadings between items and their respective constructs being greater than 0.70 [5, 19]. An examination of the composite reliability scores in Table 1 indicates that all the reliability values are above the minimal acceptable limit of 0.70 [19] indicating good convergent validity. Discriminant validity was determined by comparing the AVE (average variance extracted) score for each construct to the minimal acceptable limit of 0.50 and by checking whether square roots of AVEs for constructs are greater than their correlations with other constructs [11]. As shown in Table 1, all constructs demonstrate good discriminant validity. Convergent and discriminant validity may also be tested by examining the item loading and cross loadings for each construct. These tests were also preformed and confirmed the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs.

The structural model was assessed in terms of path coefficients and R^2 values for endogenous constructs, and is shown in figure 1. As can be seen from the figure, all hypothesized paths have coefficients above the minimum recommended value of 0.20 and are significant at the 0.001 level providing strong support to the hypothesized relationships.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

The intent of this research was to investigate the influence of a client's power and the quality of their partnership with an IT services provider on motivating the provider to comply with contractual obligations, cooperate with the client and invest additional resources in the IT outsourcing relationship. The results presented provide good empirical support for the theoretical propositions, with the model explaining a significant amount of the variance in the IT service provider's commitment, cooperation and compliance intentions.

The IOR literature identifies two motivational forces behind long-term relationships: (1) normative commitment: intrinsically motivated commitment driven by identification (internalization of common norms and values) and involvement with the other party and (2) instrumental commitment: extrinsically motivated commitment [4]. This research furthers our understanding of the development of long-term IT outsourcing relationships by providing both theoretical and empirical evidence of the intrinsic (partnership) and extrinsic (power) forces shaping various dimensions of provider commitment (see Figure 1). In addition, and consistent with the commitment-trust theory which views commitment as a "key mediating variable" [33], the dimensions of commitment act as mediators in the hypothesized model, between cooperation and compliance and the social constructs: power and partnership (see Figure 1).

A limitation of past IT outsourcing literature was that the relational aspects of IT outsourcing were never separated from the economic aspects. Our model captures the separate influence of these forces in the concepts of partnership and power, respectively. The results indicate that the quality of partnership has a greater impact on IT service provider's intentions than does client's power. The fact that partnership plays a key role in motivating IT service providers is consistent with other IT outsourcing studies which find partnership to be positively correlated with various outsourcing success measures [13, 28, 36]. While the impact of partnership is not new, what is interesting is the size of its effect given our definition that includes no reference to any economic incentives or benefit sharing typically found in "true" partnerships. Finally,

it has been stated that successful outsourcing relationships involve mutual dependence [28]. However, viewing dependence purely from the perspective of the service provider rather than viewing it as mutual dependence can be seen as a more conservative approach. Therefore, it is expected that the effects of interdependence would be stronger on commitment. But, given the increase in number and variety of IT service providers, shorter contracts, use of multiple providers and selective outsourcing [24, 25, 26], the power in IT outsourcing is gradually shifting in favor of the clients; thus, IT service providers' dependence on clients seems to be a reasonable basis for measuring a client's power in today's IT outsourcing relationships.

This paper expands on the current IT outsourcing literature by applying social theories as a means of explaining service provider/service receiver relationships. Power, though mentioned in previous IT outsourcing research, is specifically addressed here as it pertains to motivating IT service provider performance. The conceptualization of commitment as it pertains to IT outsourcing has also been expanded to include three distinct dimensions. Theoretical arguments were provided and evidence was provided for the impact of both power and partnership on sustaining long-term commitments. The concept of compliance was also introduced and was proven to be empirically different from cooperation. This is also the first known research to use an experimental methodology as a means of studying relational factors in IT outsourcing engagements.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 9907325 to the second and third authors. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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Table 1: Composite reliabilities, AVEs, and inter-construct correlations

Construct	Composite Reliability	# of Items	DCP	DCO	DCW	DCE	DCA	MPD	MTR	MSF	MCC	MCO
Compliance (DCP)	0.86	2	0.87									
Provider Cooperation (DCO)	0.88	3	0.74	0.85								
Willingness to Invest (DCW)	0.89	2	0.59	0.67	0.90							
Expectation of Continuity (DCE)	0.86	3	0.73	0.76	0.59	0.82						
Affective Commitment (DCA)	0.92	3	0.52	0.51	0.55	0.65	0.89					
Power {Dependence} (MPD)	0.90	4	0.29	0.34	0.18	0.30	0.04	0.83				
Trust (MTR)	0.93	2	0.47	0.43	0.41	0.60	0.77	0.08	0.94			
Satisfaction (MSF)	0.93	2	0.44	0.42	0.40	0.57	0.82	0.01	0.88	0.93		
Communication (MCC)	0.90	2	0.38	0.36	0.34	0.47	0.64	0.03	0.77	0.85	0.90	
Client Cooperation (MCO)	0.94	2	0.47	0.39	0.37	0.58	0.77	0.07	0.86	0.88	0.74	0.94

Notes:

Diagonal elements in blacken cells are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE), which should be larger than inter-construct correlations in the off-diagonal cells for discriminant validity. Fornell and Larcker's internal consistency measure shown in the composite reliability column is a measure for convergent validity and should usually be higher than 0.70. Signs for inter-construct correlations have been changed appropriately to account for negative signs for PLS weights.




Figure 1: Research Model with PLS results